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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WORKING PAPER

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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For Week Ending
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TURKEY

The problem of the tractors: The somewhat spectacular importation, under ECA auspices, of hundreds of tractors will eventually result in the creation of a new and serious strain on the structure of Turkish society. Since the machines, being so costly, are beyond the reach of most Turkish peasants, the richer farmers and absentee landlords who can afford them are likely to gain a strong competitive advantage from the operating economies which mechanized farming will presumably provide. Eventually, the poorer Turkish peasants might be compelled to go to work either for their richer fellows or on a state farm. If proper steps are taken now, the problem may be avoided. Farmer co-operatives may be one solution, especially if accompanied by large-scale programs of education, improved transportation and storage, irrigation, fertilization, reforestation, reclamation of unused land, etc. If such measures are not applied, however, the shiploads of tractors now being discharged onto the good Turkish earth, while serving to bring swift prosperity to a few farmers, may start much of a proud and sturdily independent peasantry on the road toward economic servitude.

PALESTINE

Arab and Israeli tactics at Lausanne: It appears probable that the recently resumed meetings of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) at Lausanne will serve only to bridge the gap between now and the September meeting of the General Assembly. Although it was hoped that both Arab and Israeli delegates would return to Lausanne with authority to take definitive action in the interest of promoting a settlement, neither side has yet offered any major concessions. The Arabs apparently intend to mark time in the hope that if the PCC accomplishes nothing, Arab interests will be given greater consideration in the GA.

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Nevertheless, the failure of the two parties to make the real compromises necessary to provide a workable agreement, plus the fact that the UN must soon act to replenish dwindling Arab refugee funds, makes it likely that Palestine will be high on the UN agenda.

LEBANON

Lebanese Government strengthens its hand: The Lebanese Government is building up its military strength and centralizing its authority in an effort to promote internal security and safeguard the existing regime. Having outlawed various para-military groups, the government is now taking steps to establish military training in the schools, introduce a compulsory military training program, appropriate an additional \$4,000,000 for defense, and enlarge the police force. Moreover, Riad Sulh, Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, has recently taken over the Ministry of Interior. It thus appears that Sulh, with the chief reins of governmental control in his own hands, hopes to play a strong-man role, not unlike that of his neighbor Zaim in Syria. It is doubtful, however, whether he can successfully emulate Zaim. The Lebanese are generally more mature politically than the Syrians, and also there has been considerable animosity in Lebanon to both Sulh and his regime.

NOTED IN BRIEF

The attitude which Tito has displayed since 10 July, when he announced the closing of Yugoslavia's Greek frontier, indicates a greater interest in the redemption of the Greek guerrillas from the manifest error of their ways than a strong desire to effect a rapprochement with the Greek Government. As insistent as ever on the purity of his Communist conscience, the Yugoslav leader has shed copious crocodile tears about the necessity of closing the frontier against the rebels, and there is no doubt that the encouragement of schism within the guerrilla movement is the object of much of his propaganda. Meanwhile, the only substantial evidence of a new attitude toward Greece is provided by the coolly correct and somewhat more open attitude which the Yugoslav border guards have been displaying toward their Greek opposites in the newly cleared Kaimakchalan area--although on 18 July one of Tito's frontier officers went so far as to talk to a group of UNSCOB observers operating along the Greek side of the border.

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The recessing of the Greek Parliament on 22 July leaves the vexing problems of governmental reform and the revision of the constitution in the hands of committees, with the most urgent affairs of government and national security remaining, as usual, in the hands of the cabinet and the military command. Parliament has voted to reconvene on 1 November, thus allowing time for

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for an appraisal of refugee resettlement trends and of the effectiveness of coming major anti-guerrilla operations. If developments in these fields were to become markedly favorable, however, a sharp upturn in political activity might take place even before the end of the recess, since such developments would hasten the holding of new national elections.

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The strength of the Turkish armed forces will be sharply, although only temporarily, reduced between the release of the Class of 1927 toward the end of this year and the arrival of the next class of conscripts (1928) some weeks later. The Turks are now studying the possibility of avoiding such time-lags through the induction of conscript classes by increments.

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Forecasts of a Turkish alliance with Arab states (apparently based in part upon improving Turkish-Syrian relations) are wide of the mark. Turkey most assuredly wants to maintain and strengthen friendly relations with its southern neighbors, but it would carefully avoid any exclusively regional military agreement.

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The purpose of the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee, scheduled to open in Lebanon on 26 July, is to formulate a common policy on the refugee problem and to iron out differences among the member states so that the Arabs can present a united front before the General Assembly in September. All the Arab states have agreed to send delegates, and although a "solidarity communique" will probably be issued at the close of the meeting, it is not likely that any concrete steps will have been taken to resolve fundamental inter-Arab difficulties.

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Egyptian officials have indicated strong disapproval of the "Gaza Plan," whereby Egypt would cede to Israel the Gaza strip complete with its 235,000 Arab refugees. The US, which supported the Israeli proposal, hoped that Egypt would be so relieved at the prospect of transferring responsibility for the Gaza refugees that it would be willing to give up

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the strip in return for some unspecified "territorial compensation" elsewhere. The Egyptians, however, are indignant over the suggestion that they relinquish their one tangible trophy of the Palestine war, and they have intimated that the US is playing the Israeli game. Egypt is holding to its stand that Israel must be made to take back at least 200,000 refugees (without getting more territory for them) and that the land bridge between Egypt and Jordan must be preserved.

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The Syrian-Israeli armistice is the last of the military agreements between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbors and marks the end of the purely military phase of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Egypt signed the first such accord last February. Lebanon and Jordan concluded similar armistices. Iraq has remained aloof from negotiating with Israel, but Iraqi troops left Palestine several months ago and were scheduled to return home recently from Jordan. Of the two remaining Arab states, Yemen did not concern itself with the Palestine issue, and Saudi Arabia indicated that it would go along with whatever agreement the negotiating Arab states concluded.

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